This paper exploits the unique disbursement timing and benefit rules of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to provide new evidence on how families adjust their labor supply in response to receiving anticipated cash transfers. I find that income seasonality caused by EITC receipt leads to changes in the intra-year labor supply patterns of married women. On average, receiving a $1,000 payment significantly reduces the proportion of married women who work, by 1.3 percentage points, in the month when the EITC is received. Additionally, this labor supply response is mainly driven by those who are secondary earners or liquidity-constrained.
I. Introduction
Do households adjust their behavior in response to receiving expected income payments? This question is crucial to understanding households' behavior and analyzing aspects of government policy. For example, it has important implications for the design of welfare programs, especially for determining the payment frequency for welfare benefits. If the benefit recipient's behavior is sensitive to the receipt of income, then more frequent payments could improve policy by helping recipients to smooth out their consumption. On the other hand, the effectiveness of short-run fiscal policies, such as temporary rebates during a recession, largely depends on how people adjust their behavior after receiving payments. The central implication of the life-cycle model with a perfect credit market is that consumption behavior should not respond to predictable changes in income. A growing empirical literature tests this claim by examining whether the timing of the receipt of income is associated with the timing of household spending. Most prior studies find that families increase their spending immediately after receiving expected income payments, such as a public pension (Stephens and Unayama 2011; Stephens 2003) , temporary rebate (Parker 2014; Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2013, 2006) , or income tax refund (Souleles 1999) . These findings generally offer evidence that contradicts the theory. 1 This paper deviates from previous studies by considering an economically important but seldom addressed question: Do families change their labor supply in response to receiving an anticipated cash transfer?
2 Empirically investigating the labor-supply response has important implications for both economic theory and public policy. On the theoretical side, such investigation examines one central prediction of the life-cycle model of labor supply: Any anticipated income changes should not affect labor-supply behavior. When families are informed of a future income change, they can adjust their labor supply (leisure consumption) in advance through borrowing and saving. Thus, there should be no change in labor supply at the time when the income change is experienced. Several recent studies (for example, Saez 2003; Looney and Singhal 2006) use this prediction to assume away income effects associated with anticipated changes in tax rates when estimating the intertemporal-substitution elasticity of labor supply. However, its validity is questionable given the vast evidence on the household-spending response to predictable changes in income. Regarding policy, such investigation helps us better understand how the timing of welfare benefit payments affects household behavior. Past policy debates have mainly focused on the impact of the timing on household spending. My results will show that the timing of cash transfers also matters for the family laborsupply decision.
I use data from The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to investigate the above issue by assessing the immediate labor-supply response to receipt of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable tax credit that subsidizes the earnings of the working poor. 3 The EITC is the largest cash transfer program for lowincome families in the United States. There are two features of the EITC that make it an interesting case to study the issue at hand. First, it is widely known about and highly anticipated by the recipients. Previous studies suggest that most EITC recipients know what their EITC refund will be before filing their taxes (Romich and Weisner 2000; Chetty and Saez 2013) .
Second, the EITC could be the single largest cash transfer that many of the working poor will receive during the year. The payment is fairly large relative to the recipients' family income. During my sample period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , the average amount of EITC for eligible families was around $2,000, which can account for one month of family income.
For some families, it can be as much as 45% of their annual income. In addition, most EITC recipients receive their credit in the form of a one-time lump-sum payment within a narrow time frame. Figure 1 shows that more than half of EITCs are paid in the month of February. This concentrated delivery of cash transfers induces a large variation in families' disposable income across 12 months. I examine how family labor supply changes in response to the receipt of EITC payment.
Since most EITC recipients are low-income families with children, the primary concern over relying on variation in payment timing is that my estimates may simply reveal intra-year labor-supply patterns of specific demographic groups, such as those with low incomes or children, rather than reflecting the impact of receiving the EITC payment. I deal with this concern in two ways. First, I conduct an event-study analysis by using a comparison group of individuals who are similar to those in the treatment group in many ways but receive much smaller EITC payments to control any confounding effects unrelated to EITC receipt. For example, I use those with children but whose incomes are just above the EITC range and those without children whose incomes are within the EITC range. Note that membership in the treatment group is based on family characteristics in the previous year. It is predetermined and does not change during the year. My results show that receiving the EITC causes the labor supply of married women to drop sharply in February and have a substantial decline in January,
Figure 1 Share of Annual EITC Disbursements by Month
Notes: Data are from various issues of Monthly Treasury Statements. For each month and year, the fraction of the year's disbursements was first calculated. These fractions were then averaged by month across the years: 1997-1998, 2002-2003, 2005-2006, and 2009-2012 . Because the IRS did not provide disbursement information in 1997, I used the 1998 distribution of disbursements to impute it.
March, and April. This pattern is largely coincident with the EITC payment timing. In contrast, receiving the EITC has little impact on the timing of the labor supply for married men and single women.
Second, I restrict my sample to those receiving EITC payments and utilize the variation in the benefits they are expected to receive in a given month. Again, the amount of benefit is predetermined by the time the labor-supply decision is made. My estimates indicate that receiving a $1,000 EITC payment significantly reduces a married woman's likelihood of working, by 1.3 percentage points, in the month of EITC arrival, from a base of 47 percent. The income elasticity of labor supply for married women based on this estimate is around -0.05, which lies between the estimates found in previous studies (Blau and Kahn 2007; Heim 2007) . In line with the results from the event-study analysis, I find no statistically detectable effect of receiving a $1,000 EITC payment on the probability of working for either married men or single women. Finally, I implement a falsification test using early 1990s SIPP data. The results suggest that the seasonal work pattern for married women does not exist in the period when EITC benefits were less generous.
To explore possible causes of my findings, I perform several subgroup analyses. First, I investigate why there are very different labor-supply responses to the receipt of EITC across the groups of married women, married men, and single women, respectively. The results suggest that the seasonal pattern in the labor supply of married women is mainly driven by those who are secondary earners in their families. Single women are primary earners. I find that married women who are secondary earners significantly reduce their labor supply in response to the receipt of EITC, but those who are primary earners do not. Interestingly, a similar pattern emerges in the sample of married men. This result is consistent with findings in previous studies (Cullen and Gruber 2000; Kohara 2010) suggesting that the labor-force participation of secondary earners is sensitive to changes in family resources. 4 Next, I analyze why family labor supply changes at the time of receiving an anticipated EITC payment. One possible explanation is the presence of liquidity constraints, which force families to keep their labor supply high so as to maintain liquidity until receiving the EITC payment. The results suggest that married women from liquidity-constrained families, such as families with low liquid assets or high mortgage-to-income ratios, exhibit a significantly negative labor-supply response to the receipt of the EITC, but those from less liquidity-constrained families do not.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it examines how family labor supply responds to the receipt of an anticipated cash transfer, which is largely unexplored in prior studies. Only two recent studies have investigated this issue in developing countries where people have difficulty accessing credit. Edmonds (2006) finds that the timing of the anticipated public pension in South Africa is associated with the timing of child employment. Receipt of the pension reduces child labor supply and increases children's enrollment in school. Fernandez and Saldarriaga (2014) utilize exogenous variation in the amount of time between the payment date of the conditional transfer program and the interview date of the household survey and find evidence of 4. These phenomena have been addressed in field work. A respondent in Smeeding, Phillips, and O'Connor (2000) vividly described her working status before receiving the EITC refund. As the authors explain, "She can pay off all her [back] bills, be caught up with all her bills and not feel stressed..All she has to do is keep working until December. Then in January she can turn in her tax form so she can get that money." women's working hours in Peru declining upon receipt of a cash transfer. I contribute to this literature by providing new evidence on such labor-supply behavior in a developedcountry context. Second, this paper presents the first evidence on the impact of EITC disbursement timing on the recipients' monthly employment patterns. Most previous studies focus on how the level of EITC benefit affects a family's labor supply on an annual basis. They find that raising EITC benefits results in an increase in the employment rate for single women (Meyer 2010; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Eissa and Liebman 1996) and a decline in the employment rate for married women (Eissa and Hoynes 2004) . 5 To my knowledge, almost no existing studies examine the impact of EITC disbursement timing on recipients' labor supply. 6 One notable exception is LaLumia (2013), who exploits the timing of the EITC refund to examine whether provision of cash (receiving EITC) at the beginning of an unemployment spell affects recipients' job search intensity. She finds that EITC-eligible women who enter unemployment in February have longer unemployment durations than those who become unemployed in other months. The present paper complements her work in two important ways. First, I analyze different labor supply behavior-the immediate employment response to the receipt of a cash transfer.
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In other words, I examine whether the timing of recipients' employment closely tracks the timing of EITC disbursement. My results suggest that married women could temporarily leave their jobs in the month in which EITC benefits arrive. Second, I investigate possible reasons for these results by utilizing detailed income and asset information in SIPP data. I comprehensively analyze differences across subgroups based on the role of household earners and the tendency to be liquidity-constrained. Previous studies, including LaLumia (2013), have included limited empirical investigation of this issue.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly describes relevant EITC features. Section III discusses the data and sample selection process. Section IV proposes the empirical methodology and results. Section V discusses possible mechanisms for my findings. Section VI concludes.
II. Policy Background
The EITC is a refundable tax credit for low-income working people, particularly those with children, in the United States. In 1975, the EITC began as a small program, but it has since grown into one of the largest antipoverty programs in the United States. In 2012, the U.S. federal government spent $61 billion on the EITC, supporting more than 28 million families.
5. Hotz and Scholz (2003) offer a literature review on behavioral responses to the EITC. Eissa and Hoynes (2006) provide a review focused particularly on the EITC's impact on labor supply. 6. Previous studies find strong evidence that the timing of household spending of EITC recipients is closely related to the timing of EITC arrival. EITC recipients tend to increase their household spending, especially on durable goods (Barrow and McGranahan 2001; Adams, Einav, and Levin 2009) , consume more healthy food (McGranahan and Schanzenbach 2014) , and use more healthcare services (Hoynes, Miller, and Simon 2015; Niedzwiecki 2013) in February when they receive the credit. 7. Specifically, I focus on the adjustment of family labor supply occurring immediately, in the month of EITC arrival, rather than the delayed response a few months later or the average effect on re-employment outcomes over the unemployment spell. A taxpayer's eligibility for the EITC depends largely on her/his family's earned income (or adjusted gross income), number of qualifying children, and filing status during the tax year (previous year). 8 First, because the EITC is a policy tool aimed at encouraging the poor to work, a taxpayer must have positive earned income, defined as the sum of wage income and self-employment income. The final EITC payments in the phase-in and plateau ranges are based on earned income. In the phase-out range, the taxpayer gets the minimum of the amounts based on earned income or adjusted gross income (AGI).
9 Second, as with other means-tested transfer programs, a taxpayer's AGI and earned income have to be below a particular income cutoff, which depends on the filer's number of qualifying children and filing status. Third, a taxpayer with one or more qualifying child is eligible for a much larger credit. Qualifying children must be under the age of 19 years, or 24 years if studying full time, and must live with the taxpayer for at least half of the year. A small credit is provided to childless taxpayers. Figure 2 displays the 2007 EITC schedule for taxpayers with and without children. The payment level is quite stable during my sample period of 1997-2012. 10 The EITC schedule consists of three regions: the phase-in region, in which the tax credit increases 8. According to the Internal Revenue Service, "A tax year is an annual accounting period for keeping records and reporting income and expenses." Thus, a tax year usually refers to the previous year. From here on, I will use tax year and previous year interchangeably. There are three filing statuses: joint filing, single, and head of household. The first is for a married couple and the last two are for unmarried people. 9. AGI is a taxpayer's total income from all sources, excluding nontaxable income such as welfare benefits, minus any adjustments to income. The adjustments could be moving expenses, alimony paid, health savings account deductions, and so on. at a given rate as earned income (or AGI) rises, the plateau region, in which the tax credit stays constant at the maximum amount, and the phase-out region, in which the tax credit declines at a specific rate for each extra dollar of income. The phase-in and phase-out rates depend on the number of qualifying children. For example, the phase-in rate for a taxpayer with one child is 0.34, so that one extra dollar of income would raise the EITC refund by 34 cents. The credit stops rising when it reaches the maximum amount and then stays unchanged until income hits the phase-out threshold. The credit will then start to phase out at the rate of 16 cents per extra dollar of income until it disappears entirely.
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In sum, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the credits paid to EITC recipients. For a taxpayer with two or more children, the maximum credit can account for 40% of annual family income. However, the maximum credit for a childless taxpayer only accounts for 5% of annual family income.
EITC payments usually arrive in the first quarter of the calendar year, mostly in February. Based on various issues of Monthly Treasury Statements (MTS), on average, the share of payments made in February is 56% and that in March is 22%.
12 This disbursement pattern is very different from those of other transfer programs and overpayment refunds, which tend to be distributed evenly over the calendar year.
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III. Data and Sample
In this section, I briefly introduce the data source and estimation sample. The Online Appendix provides interested readers with additional information about the data and sample.
A. Data
The data I use come from the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP. The SIPP is a national representative survey of welfare program participation, employment and income dynamics, health insurance coverage, assets, liabilities, and related topics. The initial sample size for each panel is about 35,000 households and 100,000
10. Each year, the EITC payment is adjusted for inflation. The program was still being expanded somewhat during this period. For example, from 2010 to 2013, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the EITC was temporarily expanded for families with three or more children. Therefore, the phase-in rate for families with three or more children became 45 percent of income (up from 40 percent). This change effectively raised the maximum credit for these families by around $600. The act also increased the income threshold at which credit begins to be phased out for married couples, to $5,000. 11. Since 2002, married couples (married and filing jointly) have had a larger income threshold, below which they can receive the maximum amount of credit, which means that more tax credit is offered to married couples than to singles. 12. These are published by the Treasury Department's Financial Management Service (years 1997 Service (years -2012 . The information is available at https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/mthTreasStmt/current.htm (accessed August 7, 2017) . As the IRS did not provide disbursement information in 1997, I used the 1998 distribution of disbursements to impute it. 13. Other transfer programs, such as Supplemental Security Income, Food Stamps, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, send the benefits out monthly. Individual income tax refunds are distributed evenly over March to May (Barrow and McGranahan 2001). individuals. Each panel is a longitudinal survey that follows the initially selected household members for at least three years, with interviews every four months. In each interview, the respondent reports her/his labor force participation and income sources for each of the preceding four months. Most of the information is reported at a monthly or quarterly frequency. One exception is the variable indicating laborforce status, which the SIPP provides weekly for each respondent. I use this information to construct my outcome variable.
The SIPP data have two features that make them especially suitable for this paper. First, they have a longitudinal structure. This feature not only allows me to determine the treatment status for each person and precisely calculate the EITC payments by utilizing information on each family's income and number of qualifying children during the previous year, but also enables me to control for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity by including individual fixed effects in the regression.
Second, the SIPP also surveys household wealth and asset information once per year in its Assets, Liabilities, and Eligibility topical module. The module provides the latest measurements of household assets, wealth and debts, as of the interview date, such as the value of deposits in bank accounts, stock and mutual fund holdings, home equity, vehicle equity, business equity, secured and unsecured debt, and mortgages. This information allows me to explore possible explanations for my empirical findings by splitting the sample on the basis of a family's tendency to be trapped by liquidity constraints. I use asset and wealth data from the topical module of the previous year to construct my measures of the family's liquid assets and mortgage-to-income ratio, which provide an indication of a family's liquidity situation in the current year.
B. Imputed EITC Payment
The SIPP does not provide valid information about the amount of EITC that each eligible family received. Instead, I predict the EITC amount using information on family (earned) income, number of qualifying children, and filing (marital) status in the previous year. As mentioned before, the final EITC amount depends on the minimum credit, based on either earned income or AGI. Since the SIPP has information about family earned income, I use this variable directly. However, the SIPP does not provide valid information about AGI. I use family income-that is, the sum of earned income and unearned income, excluding non-taxable income such as means-tested cash transfers-to approximate AGI.
Qualifying children must be under the age of 19 years, or 24 years if studying full time, and must live with the taxpayer for at least half of the year. I use detailed information about the age of each family member, parent (father and mother) identifiers, school enrollment status, and number of months living with their parents to calculate each family's number of qualifying children. According to EITC rules, married couples have to file their taxes jointly. Single individuals with dependents can choose either single or head-of-household filing status. Both filing statuses lead to the same EITC amount. Thus, I use marital status to infer a taxpayer's filing status when computing the EITC payment.
C. Sample
To improve the measurement of my outcome variable and EITC payments for my estimation, I conduct a series of sample selection steps; I discuss how to construct the estimated sample in detail in the Online Appendix. Table A1 displays the summary statistics of the variables after each sample selection criterion has been applied. The sample characteristics are fairly similar across different samples. The years I use for my estimations are 1997-1999, 2002-2003, 2005-2006, and 2009-2012 . I also use the first year of each panel (1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008) to infer the treatment status and predicted EITC amount in the following years. The final sample size comprises 25,392 individuals and 480,888 individual-month observations. According to statistics from the IRS, during my sample period, the average EITC payment was about $1,974, which is quite close to the average value of the imputed credit amount, at $2,130. All dollar amounts are in 2007 USD.
IV. Empirical Methodology and Results
I first conduct an event-study analysis to determine whether monthly variation in the work efforts of EITC recipients coincides with EITC disbursement timing. I then use the predicted EITC amount to exploit variation in treatment intensity. In general, my estimation exploits two sources of variation: first, monthly variation in disposable income induced by EITC receipt and, second, cross-sectional variation in EITC payments based on income level and number of children in the previous year.
A. Event-Study Analysis
I begin with an event-study analysis to estimate the impact of EITC receipt on monthly labor supply of families receiving high EITC benefits. This method compares the difference in the labor supply between EITC disbursement months and other months, for a treatment group and a comparison group, which is presumed to remove any shocks, other than the receipt of EITC payments, that might affect the labor-supply decision of a treatment group. Following prior literature (McGranahan and Schanzenbach 2014; Niedzwiecki 2013; LaLumia 2013; Barrow and McGranahan 2001) , I exploit EITC benefit rules to construct a comparison group of individuals who are similar to those in the treatment group in many ways but receive much smaller EITC payments, such as low-income individuals without children and those with children but whose income is just above the EITC range. Thus, I define my treatment and comparison groups using (i) family income in the previous year and (ii) the number of qualifying children in the previous year, and estimate the following regression:
where L imt is my outcome of interest, the share of weeks worked by individual i in month m of year t. Since the SIPP provides labor-force status weekly, 14 I use the number of 14. The SIPP questionnaire gives a respondent five choices for weekly labor-force status: (i) with job or business, working; (ii) with job or business, absent without pay; (iii) with job or business, on layoff; (iv) no job or business, looking for job or on layoff; (v) no job or business, neither looking for job nor on layoff. I use the working weeks divided by the number of weeks in the month to construct this variable: L imt = 1 if individual i works for the full month; L imt = 0 if individual i does not work at all during the month; 0 < L imt < 1 denotes cases in between. The advantage of the above definition is that it can also capture changes in labor-force status within a month. The variable LowInc it -1 refers to whether individual i's family income in year t -1 is greater than zero and less than the EITC income limit (LowInc it -1 = 1) or is greater than the EITC income limit and less than $40,000 (LowInc it -1 = 0). The income limit roughly corresponds to the maximum EITC-eligible income for families with one child during the sample period. For a married couple, the income limit is $36,000, and for single women, it is $33,000. The variable Child it -1 refers to whether individual i has one or more qualifying children in year t -1 (Child it -1 ) or has no qualifying children in year t -1 (Child it -1 = 0). The treatment group dummy EITC it can be expressed as an interaction term between LowInc it -1 and Child it -1 . Therefore, EITC it = 1 indicates that individual i belongs to the treatment group that is expected to receive high EITC payments in the year t, namely, those whose family income is below the EITC income limit and who have one or more children in year t -1. EITC it = 0 denotes that individual i is in the comparison group that is expected to receive low EITC in year t due to either having too great an income or being childless in year t -1. Note that group assignment is based on the previous year's information, which is predetermined by the time an individual makes her labor-supply decision. In other words, an individual's current labor supply does not affect her treatment status. I use M m , where m = 1,2,3,.12, to denote dummy variables for each month. For example, M 1 represents a dummy for January. Note that October is used as the baseline month because less than 1% of the total EITC disbursement is paid in this month.
The key variables used for identification in Regression 1 are a set of month dummies M m interacted with the treatment-group dummy EITC it . Two assumptions are essential to ensure that the coefficients on these interactions, b em , have a causal interpretation. First, in the absence of EITC payments, the difference in labor supply between the treatment and comparison groups should be similar across all 12 months. In a later section, I conduct a placebo test using a sample from a time period when the EITC benefits were much less generous (that is, early 1990s SIPP data) to examine the validity of this assumption. Second, the composition of the two groups does not change across months. Since the membership of each group is based on the previous year's information, there is no change in group composition within the current year. Moreover, the estimated sample is a fixed panel that follows the same individuals over 12 months.
Since the treatment group consists of low-income individuals with children, the primary concern with the estimates is that the results could simply reveal monthly patterns in labor supply for specific groups, namely low-income individuals or individuals with children, regardless of the impact of receiving the EITC payment. Hence, I interact the month dummies M m with the low-income dummy LowInc it -1 to further control for any monthly seasonality in labor supply that is specific to low-income individuals. Similarly, to control for any monthly employment patterns for individuals with children, I also include group-specific month fixed effects for those who have qualifying children:
first option to indicate that a respondent is working in a given week, and the other four to indicate that she or he is not working.
To control for common macroeconomic effects during my sample period, I include the year fixed effect d t and a vector of time-variant or time-invariant state variables S mt , such as monthly state unemployment rate, state fixed effect, and state-specific time trend. In addition, the panel structure of the data allows the inclusion of individual fixed effects n i to control for any unobservable time-invariant differences in labor-supply preferences between individuals, such as time preferences (for example, impatience).
Finally, to improve the precision of the estimates, I include a vector of covariates, X imt , that could affect an individual's labor-supply decision: race, educational attainment, working part time, industry fixed effects, family wealth, and living in a metropolitan area.
15 I also interact the above variables with the month dummies M m to further isolate the EITC effect from the monthly impacts of other confounding factors. The variable e imt represents an error term. Since I follow the same individuals over time, to account for possible serial correlation that might affect the estimation of the standard error, standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the person level. All regressions are weighted using person-level weights provided by SIPP. In the later section, I conduct robustness checks on the estimates by computing the standard errors at different cluster levels and using unweighted regressions. Figure 3 compares the distribution of EITC payments between the treatment and comparison groups for married couples and single women. One can see that most individuals in the comparison group have predicted EITC payments of zero. On average, the predicted amount of EITC for married couples in the treatment group is about $2,450. However, those from the comparison groups only receive $140 on average. For single women, individuals from the treatment group are predicted to receive about $2,340, and those from the comparison group just $70.
16 Table 1 displays summary statistics of selected variables for the treatment and comparison groups. As expected, the treatment group has less family (earned) incomes, more children, and greater predicted EITC amounts than the comparison groups. In addition, the treatment group consists of younger, less wealthy, and less educated individuals than the comparison groups. However, except for the EITC-related variables (that is, income and number of children), the differences in the covariates between the treatment and comparison groups are not statistically significant after controlling for individual fixed effects. Furthermore, I control for individual fixed effects, these covariates, and their interaction terms with month dummies in my specifications, which substantially reduces the impact of these group differences on the estimates. Figure 4a displays the coefficients on EITC it · M m and the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals based on the sample of married women. One can see that the eventstudy coefficients largely mirror the timing of EITC disbursement. Compared to married women who receive low EITC payments, the labor supply of those receiving high EITC 15. The categories for an individual's educational attainment are high school dropout, high school degree, and college and above. Information about family wealth (2007 USD) is taken from the Assets, Liabilities, and Eligibility topical module for the previous year. I use the information on a respondent's industry in the previous year. Individuals are categorized into three groups: agriculture, manufacturing, and service and others. The definition of a part-time worker is that the average weekly hours worked by the individual in the previous year were greater than 0 but less than 20. 16. Note that some but very few families in the "comparison group" also receive EITC benefits. Thus, they are actually being treated. As a result, the results could slightly underestimate the effect of receiving the EITC (in absolute terms). payments drops much more in February and also shows a substantial decline in January, March, and April (relative to October). 17 Outside of these months, the difference in labor supply between the treatment and comparison groups is quite close to the baseline level in October. Figures 4b and 4c present the estimates for married men and single women, respectively. In sharp contrast, no such pattern emerges for them. The group differences in the outcome variable are quite similar over the 12 months. Table  A2 in the Online Appendix displays the estimated coefficients of EITC it · M m for the event-study analysis. 17. Note that the January point estimate is not statistically different from the February estimate. A possible explanation is that EITC recipients could still have obtained their payments earlier than the MTS data show by using Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs), for which users were charged a very high fee (an implicit interest rate) to expedite the receipt of their benefits. The service allowed taxpayers to receive their refunds immediately upon filing their tax returns. Wu (2012) shows that around 18 percent of EITC recipients received their tax refunds early via RALs. Moreover, according to McGranahan and Schanzenbach (2014) , around 10 percent of EITC benefits were used to reduce the recipient's tax liability. Taken together, these aspects imply that a substantial number of EITC recipients may have obtained their credits in January. In addition, only the February coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Notes: SIPP data for years 1996-1999, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, and 2008-2012 . Family income is the sum of earned income and unearned income, excluding the nontaxable mean-tested cash transfer. Family income, earned income, wealth, and EITC payment are in thousands of dollars. Family income, earned income, wealth, number of qualifying children, and EITC payment are based on the family level information in the previous year. Monthly employment is defined as number of working weeks in a month divided by total number of weeks in a month. White, high school, college and above, agriculture, manufacturing, self-employed, not working, working part time, and living in metro are dummy variables. State unemployment rate (percent) is monthly unemployment rate in a given state. The high-EITC group (treatment group) consists of those individuals that have one or more qualifying children and family income greater than zero and less than EITC income limit during the previous year. The low-EITC group (comparison group) comprise (i) those individuals that have family income greater than zero and less than EITC income limit during the previous year but have no qualifying child, (ii) those individuals with one or more qualifying children but whose family income during the previous year is above EITC income limit and below $40,000, (iii) childless individuals that have family income during the previous year is above EITC income limit and below $40,000. The income limit roughly corresponds to the maximum EITC-eligible income for the families with one child during my sample period. For a married couple, the income limit is $36,000 and for single women it is $33,000. All dollar amounts are in 2007 USD. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Star indicates a significant difference across the preceding two columns after controlling individual fixed effects. For the variables changing monthly (for example, monthly employment), I run a regression using number of individual-months observations to test group difference. For the variables changing annually, I run a regression using # of individual-years observations to test group difference. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.
I conduct two complementary estimations in the Online Appendix. First, following previous studies (Barrow and McGranahan 2001; LaLumia 2013; Niedzwiecki 2013; McGranahan and Schanzenbach 2014) , I summarize my event-study results by replacing EITC it · M m with a single variable EITC it · M m (that is, triple-differences estimation). 18 The estimated results are shown in Table A3 of the Online Appendix; my preferred specification (Column 5 in Panel A) indicates that, compared to married women who receive low amounts of credit, those who receive high EITC payments are, significantly, 2.9 percentage points less likely to work in February than in other months. In contrast, married men and single women who receive high EITC payments do not exhibit distinct likelihoods of working in February compared to other months. Second, I exploit month-to-month labor-force transitions so as to understand the main cause of Figure 4 The Impact of EITC on Intra-Year Labor Supply Patterns Notes: This figure shows coefficients on the interaction terms between indicator for treatment group EITC and 11 month dummies (October is the omitted month) M m and associated 95% confidence interval from Specification 1 where the dependent variable L is the share of weeks worked in a month defined as number of working weeks divided by total number of weeks in a month. Therefore, L = 1 if working for the full month, L = 0 if not working for the full month, and 0 < L < 1 if working for partial month. The estimated sample is restricted to married men. The assignment of treatment and control groups are based on 1997-2012 EITC schedule (Figure 4a , 4b, and 4c) or 1990-93 EITC schedule (Figure 4d ).
Note that M 2 is a February dummy.
Yang 459 married women's decreased likelihood of working when receiving EITC payments. Although the estimates are not precise (see Figure A2 and Table A4 in the Online Appendix), the results provide suggestive evidence that married women could temporarily leave their jobs without pay upon receiving the EITC refund in February.
B. Variation in Predicted EITC Payments
The event-study analysis has the virtue of having a source of identification that is quite transparent as it compares group-level outcomes. The drawback of this approach is that it simply compares mean differences between the two broad groups (that is, high EITC versus low EITC) without considering treatment intensity (amount of benefits). However, there is substantial within-group variation in the amount of expected EITC payment across individuals.
In this section, I utilize the EITC refund that recipients are expected to receive in a given month to quantify the impact of receiving a $1,000 EITC refund on the recipient's labor supply during the month of refund disbursement. This approach has the advantage of allowing variation in treatment intensity among EITC recipients. If the intra-year labor-supply pattern of married women found in the previous section is driven by EITC receipt, a more negative effect on labor supply should be found among those receiving larger EITC payments. To alleviate concern over comparability of labor-supply behavior between EITC-eligible and EITC-ineligible individuals, the sample is limited to EITC recipients. Estimation is based on the following regression:
In the spirit of Souleles (1999) and McGranahan and Schanzenbach (2014) , a variable is constructed indicating the EITC payment that each recipient is predicted to receive in a given month, in the following ways. First, the variable Refund it represents the EITC payment (in thousands of dollars) that individual i is predicted to receive in yeart. Note that Refund it is predetermined as regards the dependent variable L imt , since the EITC payment amount is based on information from the previous year (year t -1). 19 In other words, the current labor-supply decision has no impact on the amount of EITC received. It has to be pointed out that most but not all of the tax refunds received by low-income families come from the EITC. Several previous studies (for example, LaLumia 2013; Romich and Weisner 2000) show that the EITC could account for 70 percent to 80 percent of the tax refund for EITC-eligible families. Furthermore, the amount of the non-EITC refund, which comes from elements such as the child tax credit, may be positively correlated with the EITC amount. Therefore, it may be reasonable to assume that a larger EITC payment will be associated with a larger tax refund. The predicted amount of EITC payment should provide a good approximation of the tax refund that low-income families will receive. Second, since SIPP does not have information about when respondents receive their EITC payments, I use the aggregate-level measure of the share of annual EITC disbursement paid out in a given month m of year t, Share mt , to approximate the date on which the recipient receives their EITC refund. 20 For example, Share is set to 0.6 in February 2010, since 60 percent of the 2010 EITC refunds were disbursed in February. Using group-level refund timing instead of the exact dates on which individuals receive their EITC refunds could substantially reduce the endogeneity problem since the exact timing of the refund will largely depend on when an individual files her/his tax statement, which might be correlated with unobservable determinants of the individual's labor supply.
The key variable in this regression is the interaction term between Refund it and Share mt , which represents the expected EITC payment in a given month for individual i. The coefficient of interest, b IND , directly measures the effect of receiving a $1,000 EITC payment on individual i's labor supply in the month in which the EITC payment arrives. This estimate is useful later, when I compute the income elasticity of labor supply based on this short-run change in labor supply induced by the EITC refund. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients on Refund · Share from Equation 2. The control variables are gradually included to test the sensitivity of the results to different specifications. The estimates across the specifications are fairly independent of the introduction of different sets of control variables. My preferred specification is that in Column 5 of Table 2 , which includes a vector of covariates X imt that might affect both the labor supply and the EITC amount, such as a low-income dummy, a dummy for having children, race, educational attainment, working part time, industry fixed effects, family wealth, living in a metropolitan area, and their interactions with Share mt .
21 This is the most conservative specification since these interaction terms can absorb some of the variation in the expected EITC payment in a given month (Refund · Share). 22 The estimate in Column 5 suggests that the receipt of a $1,000 EITC payment reduces the proportion of married women who work by 1.3 percentage points in the month of EITC receipt. Since the baseline mean of the outcome variable is 47 percent, the estimated decrease represents a 2.7 percent decline in the mean. In line with the results of my event-study analysis, these results imply that receiving a $1,000 EITC payment does not have a statistically detectable impact on the share of weeks worked by either married men or single women in the month in which the EITC is paid out. However, only the estimate for single women is statistically different from one for married women. 23 20. These data come from various issues of MTS. 21. The low-income dummy is equal to one if the family income is below $12,000 (in 2007 USD), which corresponds to the first income cutoff in the EITC schedule for married couples during my sample period. 22. Table A5 in the Online Appendix is the "balance table" for Specification 2. I examine the relationship between Refund in Specification 2 (the imputed EITC amount) and the individual characteristics that might affect seasonality in the labor supply of married women. To get a better understanding of which individual characteristics affect Refund, I gradually include covariates. Table A5 shows that, after controlling individual fixed effects, only the low-income dummy, a dummy for having children, and age are always statistically significantly correlated with Refund at the 1 percent level. 23. Based on the estimates in Column 5 of Table 2 , the p-value of the difference between married women and married men (single women) is 0.2 (0.08). 2). The outcome variable L is monthly employment status defined as number of working weeks in a month divided by total number of weeks in a month. The baseline mean is the proportion of individuals working in October. Therefore, L = 1 if working for the full month, L = 1 if not working for the full month, and 0 < L < 1 if working for partial month. The outcome variable is regressed on the imputed EITC amounts that an individual will receive Refund, as interacted with share of annual EITC disbursement paid out in a given month and year Share. The sample is restricted to EITC recipients. Column 1 controls for Refund, Share, and month fixed effects. Column 2 additionally includes individual fixed effects. Column 3 additionally includes year fixed effects, state fixed effects, monthly state unemployment rate, and state specific time trend (quadratic). Column 4 additionally includes individual characteristics: educational attainments, race, age, living in metro area, family wealth, industry fixed effects, and a dummy indicating that the individual worked part-time in the previous year. Column 5 additionally includes interactions between individual characteristics and Share. All dollar values are measured in 2007 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the person level and reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.
C. Discussion: Magnitude of the Estimates
In this section, I begin by discussing the estimates obtained from the two empirical approaches and then compare their magnitudes to estimates from the prior literature. Specification 2 suggests that, on average, the receipt of a $1,000 EITC payment leads to a reduction, of 1.3 percentage points, in the likelihood of married women working during the month in which the EITC is received. The magnitude based on this specification indeed provides a similar qualitative conclusion to the event-study analysis. I present a simple calculation to confirm their similarity. First, Tables A2 and A7 in the Online Appendix present the estimated coefficients of EITC it -1 · M m in my event-study analysis and the average share of EITC disbursement in each month during the sample period. Combining these pieces of information, I can obtain the (weighted) average employment effect of receiving the EITC payment. Note that the average gap in EITC payments between the treatment and comparison groups in the triple differences estimation is around $2,310. Therefore, the estimates based on the eventstudy analysis imply that receiving a $1,000 EITC refund could reduce the proportion of married women working by 1.32 percentage points. 24 The estimates based on these two approaches are fairly close.
One way to think about the magnitude of my estimates is to calculate the income elasticity of labor supply and then compare it to estimates reported in previous studies. The unearned income of married women is computed using the secondary-earner assumption. That is, it is equal to the husband's monthly earned income plus the family's monthly unearned income. Since receiving the EITC has little impact on married men's labor supply, it could be reasonable to assume that the average size of monthly unearned income is unrelated to the EITC refund. The mean value of the unearned income for married women in the baseline month (October) is around $1,847. My estimate suggests that receiving a $1,000 EITC refund could significantly reduce the proportion of married women who work in the month in which the refund is received, by 1.3 percentage points from the base of 47 percent. In other words, a 54 percent increase in unearned income could lead to a 2.7 percent decline in the likelihood of working in the month in which payment arrives. This implies that the income elasticity of labor supply for married women is around -0.05.
My estimated income elasticity is largely consistent with findings in previous studies. McClelland and Mok (2012) provide an up-to-date review of labor supply elasticities. They point out that previously estimated income elasticities of employment among married men and single women tend to be quite small, in fact, close to zero. However, the responsiveness of the employment of married women to income changes is substantially larger than that for married men and single women. Heim (2007) finds the income elasticity of employment for married women to be between -0.13 and -0.05. Blau and Kahn (2007) estimate it to be about -0.1. Both studies rely on cross-sectional variation in unearned income. A few recent studies use more exogenous variation in income from 24. This is derived from a simple calculation. First, I calculate weighted-average event-study coefficients by using the average share of EITC disbursement in each month as a weight: (-0 randomized experiments, such as lotteries, to get more credible estimates of the income elasticity. Jacob and Ludwig (2012) use a randomized lottery for housing vouchers and estimate the income elasticity among lower-income individuals who apply for housing assistance to be -0.09.
One caveat should be noted when comparing these results to those in the previous literature. The estimated elasticity presented here relies on a higher-frequency change in income and labor supply than previous studies have. I exploit the monthly change in income induced by the tax refund and study the impact of this short-run income change on an individual's monthly work decision. However, most prior studies have used annual changes in income and labor supply to estimate income elasticity, meaning that their estimates could represent the relatively long-run relationship between income and labor supply. Since the individual's labor supply should be less elastic in response to short-run change, this could explain why my income elasticity estimate is close to the lower bound of previous estimates (in absolute terms).
D. Robustness Checks
To verify that the drop in the employment of married women during the EITC disbursement season is not just spuriously associated with the receipt of EITC benefits, I have conducted two placebo tests using 1990-93 SIPP data. During this time, the EITC benefit was much less generous than in later years. The average EITC payment over this time was less than $1,000.
25 If the seasonal employment pattern of married women is driven by EITC receipts, one would expect such a pattern to have been less likely to exist when the benefits were small. Thus, I first conducted an event-study analysis (Specification 1). 26 In sharp contrast to my main result, Figure 4d shows that the differences in the employment of married women between the treatment and control groups are quite similar over 12 months (that is, close to the baseline level in October). In other words, the receipt of the EITC had little impact on the monthly work pattern of married women when the payments were small. Additionally, I estimated Specification 2 using the 1990-93 SIPP sample. However, I coded the expected EITC amount (Refund · Share) using the EITC schedule and disbursement timing from 2004-2007. 27 Individuals with a certain income level or number of children who would have been eligible for "large" EITC payments during 2004-2007 actually received much smaller EITC benefits in 1990-93. Thus, if the employment 25. The average EITC payment for treatment group is $982 and that for control group is $122. Thus, the difference between the amounts for the two groups during 1990-93 is $860, which is substantially less than that during the sample period. 26. The definition of the treatment and comparison groups was based on the 1990-93 EITC schedule. The income limit of EITC for married couples was around $23,000 (in 2007). Thus, the treatment group consists of those individuals that have one or more qualifying children and family income greater than zero and less than EITC income limit during the previous year. The comparison group comprises (i) those individuals that have family income greater than zero and less than $23,000 during the previous year but have no qualifying child, (ii) those individuals with one or more qualifying children but whose family income during the previous year was above $23,000 and below $40,000, and (iii) childless individuals that have family income during the previous year is above $23,000 and below $40,000. 27. In other words, I use the 2004 (2005, 2006, 2007) EITC schedule for the 1990 (1991, 1992, 1993) sample. pattern of married women suggested by my main estimates were not driven by other confounding factors correlated with EITC payments, such as income level or having children, these fake "benefits" should have had a null effect on married women's work efforts during the EITC disbursement months. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that there is little evidence of the monthly employment pattern of married women being associated with the imputed EITC payments.
Some states have supplemental state EITCs. The size of the state EITC varies across states and time, which generates an additional source of variation in the EITC payments. Table A6 in the Online Appendix summarizes the eligibility rules and payment amounts for state EITCs. Column 2 of Table 3 presents the estimate based on Equation 2, incorporating this state-level variation. I find that the point estimate is quite similar to my baseline result. In Column 3, the outcome variable is redefined as follows: L imt = 1 for an individual who works in any week during the given month, and L imt = 0 otherwise. This definition is more comparable to the outcome variable of labor supply that appears in previous studies using annual data, but it ignores within-month variation in the labor supply. Again, this change has little impact on my estimates. Column 4 of Table 3 presents statistical inferences based on a different clustering level for standard errors. Since the policy variation used here is at the group-month level, 28 I present the standard errors clustered on the group-month cells to account for any dependence of the unobservable error within the group-month level. Column 5 shows that the estimated coefficients from an unweighted regression are smaller than my main estimates (in terms of absolute value), although the point estimates are statistically indistinguishable from my main estimates.
Next, I examine the robustness of my results to different sample selection criteria. In my main specification, households containing subfamilies are excluded. To test the sensitivity of the results to this, I recalculate the results based on a sample including these omitted households and display them in Column 6. I find this change to have little impact on the estimate. There is a potential concern that the estimates could be confounded by fluctuations in labor demand due to holiday-season jobs. Workers in these jobs are usually hired in the fourth quarter of the calendar year and might quit their jobs in the first quarter of the following year. To alleviate this concern, in Column 7 of Table 3 , I present estimates based on a sample excluding those who were working in the retail industry at the end of the previous year. This restriction reduces the sample by around 8% but has little impact on the estimates. Finally, I address the fact that the baseline sample is restricted to married women aged 20 to 55, while their spouses might not be between the ages of 20 and 55. In fact, 7% of married women in the baseline sample had spouses aged above 55. Column 8 presents the results based on a sample excluding married women whose spouses were outside of the specified age range. The estimates here are quite similar to my baseline cases. In sum, my main estimates are quite robust to alternative empirical specifications and sample selections. The above analysis suggests that receiving a $1,000 EITC payment reduces married women's employment by 1 to 1.4 percentage points during the EITC disbursement months.
28. I have four groups. One is the treatment group, and the other three are comparison groups. Therefore, the total number of group-month cells is 48 (4 groups · 12 months). otherwise. Column 4 shows the estimates using standard errors clustered on the group-month level (4 groups · 12 months). Column 5 shows the estimated coefficients from an unweighted regression. Column 6 presents results that includes households with subfamilies. Column 7 presents results based on a sample excluding married women who worked in the retail industry in the end of previous year. Column 8 presents results based on a sample excluding married women whose spouses are outside of the age range (20-55). All regressions controls for the same set of covariates shown in Column 5 of Table 2 . Standard errors are clustered at the person level and reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.
V. Mechanisms
A. Secondary Earner I next examine why married women's labor supply responds to the receipt of an EITC refund, but married men's and single women's do not. One possible explanation is that most married women are the secondary workers in their families. Prior studies find the labor supply of secondary earners to be quite sensitive to changes in family resources (Cullen and Gruber 2000) . The "added worker effect" hypothesis holds that, under an imperfect credit market, the secondary earners in families, typically married women, could provide transitory earning sources to smooth out household spending whenever their families are facing temporary shortages of liquidity (for example, for mortgage commitments). Secondary earners may then exit the labor market once the family's need for liquidity has been met (Goux and Petrongolo 2014; Kohara 2010; Lundberg 1980; Heckman and MaCurdy 1980; Mincer 1962 ). Hence, one should expect a secondary earner to exhibit a more negative labor-supply response to EITC receipt than a primary earner. Another potential explanation for my findings is that female EITC recipients have specific intra-year patterns of labor supply that are coincident with EITC disbursement timing. I use information on individual earnings in the previous year to define primary and secondary earners within each family. An individual who had lower annual earnings than their spouse during the previous year is classified as the secondary earner.
29 I begin by focusing on married couples and estimate Specification 2 for the following four subgroups: married women who are primary earners, married women who are secondary earners, married men who are primary earners, and married men who are secondary earners.
The first four columns in Table 4 display the coefficients on Refund · Share for the above four subgroups. The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the negative laborsupply response to EITC receipt for married women found in the previous section is exclusively driven by those who are secondary earners in their families. On average, upon receiving a $1,000 EITC payment, married women who are secondary earners are significantly less likely to work, by 1.6 percentage points, in the month in which the EITC refund is received. In contrast, those who are primary earners show an insignificant decrease in the likelihood of working, of 0.2 percentage points. Interestingly, a similar pattern arises in the sample of married men. A married man who is his family's secondary earner exhibits a reduction of 1.4 percentage points in his likelihood of working in the month in which he receives a $1,000 EITC refund. The magnitude of this estimate is fairly close to the estimate for married women but is not statistically significant due to the small sample size for this group. The above results imply that the negative labor-supply response to EITC receipt for married women could result from different gender roles due to the division of labor within families, rather than from gender differences in intra-year labor supply patterns among EITC recipients.
29. It is worth noting that this definition of a secondary earner might not necessarily reveal the role of household earner that a wife or husband plays. A recent paper by Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) shows that there is a discontinuity in the wife's share of a couple's total earned income, at 0.5, which they argue is due to gender identity norms.
To further compare the two possible channels that could underlie my results, I pool the whole sample together (including single women) and "horse race" the "secondary earner" channel against the "gender difference" channel by interacting the intercept, a set of month dummies, and the predicted monthly EITC amount with an indicator for being female (Female) and a dummy indicating that a person is a secondary earner (Second), respectively, in Specification 2. The first row in the last column of Table 4 suggests that receiving a $1,000 EITC payment leads the baseline group's likelihood of working in the month of EITC receipt to decline by 0.2 percentage points, insignificantly. Note that the baseline group consists of married men who are primary earners. The "secondary earner" channel's coefficient (in the second row) reveals that those who are secondary earners in their families will be an additional 1.6 percentage points less likely to work in a month in which they receive a $1,000 EITC refund. The point estimate is significant, with a p-value of 0.03. However, the "gender difference" 2). The outcome variable L is monthly employment status defined as number of working weeks in a month divided by total number of weeks in a month. Therefore, L = 1 if working for the full month, L = 0 if not working for the full month, and 0 < L < 1 if working for partial month. The outcome variable is regressed on the imputed EITC amounts that an individual will receive Refund, as interacted with share of annual EITC disbursement paid out in a given month and year Share. In the last column, based on Equation 2, I also interact the intercept, predicted monthly EITC amount, and a set of month dummies with an indicator for female (Female) and a dummy indicating secondary earner (Second), respectively. The sample is restricted to EITC recipients. All regressions control for Female, Second and the same set of covariates shown in Column 5 of Table 2 . All dollar values are measured in 2007 dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the person level and reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.
channel's coefficient (third row) suggests that there is no statistically detectable additional impact of being female on the probability of working in the month in which the refund arrives, after controlling for the effect of being a "secondary earner."
B. Liquidity Constraints
Next, I analyze why families reduce their labor supply upon receipt of an anticipated EITC payment. The leading explanation for the observed behavior is the presence of liquidity constraints preventing families from borrowing future income to finance current spending. In this situation, families may keep their level of labor supply high to improve their liquidity until their tight budget is loosened by the receipt of the EITC refund. If liquidity constraints do play an important role in determining family labor supply, one would expect the negative labor-supply response of married women to the receipt of the EITC to be driven by those women from "more constrained" families. I use two proxy variables to indicate the family's tendency to be liquidity constrained: liquid assets (the value of bank deposits in the previous year) and the mortgage-toincome ratio (the amount of the mortgage divided by total family income in the previous year). Both variables are computed at the family level for the calendar year before EITC receipt. Following the standard methodology in the prior literature (Parker 2014; Johnson et al. 2013 Johnson et al. , 2006 Souleles 1999; Zeldes 1989) , for each variable, I divide the sample into two sets of individuals: those likely to be liquidity constrained and those likely not to be. I use Constained to denote membership of the liquidity-constrained group and interact it with the intercept and the expected EITC amount in a given month in Specification 2. Hence, the additional labor-supply response to receiving a $1,000 EITC payment, for liquidity-constrained individuals, would be identified by the interaction between the indicator for the constrained group and the predicted monthly EITC payment. Individuals with low liquid assets could be unable to draw down their wealth to smooth out their spending. In order to improve their family's liquidity, they will likely adjust their labor supply, which could result in a greater negative labor-supply response to receiving the EITC payment. In the spirit of Parker (2014) , I label those with liquid assets below the one-month average family income ($2,000) constrained families and the rest unconstrained. Column 1 of Table 5 shows how the labor-supply response to an EITC payment varies according to the liquid assets held. The first row indicates that, for married women with high liquid assets, receiving a $1,000 EITC payment insignificantly increases the likelihood of working by 0.1 percentage points in the month of EITC receipt, and this estimate is not statistically significant. In sharp contrast, receiving a $1,000 EITC refund significantly lowers the proportion of married women with low liquid assets who work, by 1.4 percentage points (Row 3). The point estimate of the group difference is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.07 (Row 2).
Prior studies (Del Boca and Lusardi 2003; Fortin 1995) show that a mortgage commitment is an important factor determining the labor-force participation of married women. Furthermore, those who have large mortgages might also have limited borrowing ability, since housing collateral is often used for borrowing (Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013; Mian and Sufi 2011) . I use the mortgage-to-income ratio to approximate the likelihood of families being bound by liquidity constraints. Families with high mortgage-to-income ratios may be under greater pressure to meet their mortgage commitments and have limited credit lines for borrowing additional money. Under these circumstances, married women with high mortgage-to-income ratios might enter the labor market temporarily to increase family liquidity, and their work decision may be sensitive to the change in family liquidity induced by the EITC refund. To investigate this hypothesis, I restrict the sample to house owners, which accounts for around 56 percent of the EITC recipients in my sample. I classify families with a mortgage-toincome ratio of 1.5 or above as constrained and the remainder as less constrained. A mortgage-to-income ratio of 1.5 is around the median of the distribution of mortgage-toincome ratios. Column 2 of Table 5 shows how the labor-supply response to an EITC payment varies according to the mortgage-to-income ratio. For married women with low mortgage-to-income ratios, the receipt of a $1,000 EITC refund results in a decrease of 0.9 of a percentage point in the likelihood of working in the month in which the EITC is received (Row 1). However, the point estimate is not statistically significant. In contrast, the receipt of a $1,000 EITC refund significantly lowers the proportion of married women with a high mortgage-to-income ratio who work, by 2.3 percentage 2). In addition, I use Constrained to denote membership in the liquidity-constrained group and interact it with the intercept and predicted EITC amount Refund · Share. The sample is restricted to EITC recipients (Married Women). The outcome variable L is monthly employment status defined as number of working weeks in a month divided by total number of weeks in a month. Therefore, L = 1 if working for the full month, L = 0 if not working for the full month, and 0 < L < 1 if working for partial month. The outcome variable is regressed on the imputed EITC amounts that an individual will receive Refund, as interacted with share of annual EITC disbursement paid out in a given month and year Share. All regressions control for Constrained and the same set of covariates shown in Column 5 of Table 2 . All dollar values are measured in 2007 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the person level and reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.
points (Row 3). This labor-supply response is more than two times as large as that of married women from families with lower mortgage-to-income ratio (in absolute value).
VI. Conclusions
This paper utilizes the unique disbursement pattern and benefit rules of the EITC to examine the causal effect of the receipt of a cash transfer on the timing of family labor supply. The results show that income seasonality caused by EITC receipt leads to changes in the intra-year labor supply patterns of married women. On average, receiving a $1,000 EITC payment reduces the proportion of married women who work in the month of receiving the credit by 1.3 percentage points from a baseline mean of 47 percent. The income elasticity of labor supply for married women based on these shortrun changes in labor supply and income is around -0.05, which falls within the range of estimates in the previous literature that were obtained using longer horizons for employment and income changes. No such tax-refund-induced intra-year change in labor supply emerges for married men or single women. The subgroup analysis suggests families might reduce the labor supply of secondary earners in response to receiving an anticipated EITC payment. In addition, the results suggest that the presence of liquidity constraints among EITC recipients could be an important reason for these findings.
Several interesting implications arise from my results. First, both this paper and previous studies consistently provide evidence of liquidity constraints among those claiming the EITC. These results imply that providing payments more frequently prior to the filing of taxes, such as through the Advance EITC, should be an attractive option for low-income taxpayers and could substantially help liquidity-constrained recipients to smooth their spending and leisure throughout the year. However, the low rate of participation in the Advance EITC is still a puzzle in the literature, and it has not been offered as an option since 2011. A recent study (Jones 2010 ) has made some progress toward solving this puzzle. In general, they find that the universally low takeup might not have resulted from recipients' lack of information about it, from the application process being too complicated, or from recipients' fear of stigma. Jones (2012) finds strong evidence of inertia among EITC recipients, suggesting that making periodic EITC payments the default option could greatly encourage people to obtain their EITC throughout the year before filing their taxes. Further research on this issue is needed to aid the design of a more feasible option for periodic EITC payments.
On the other hand, the present results clearly show that married couples have more flexibility in terms of adjusting their labor supply so as to smooth out their spending than singles. One possibility for future research would be to examine whether the response of household spending to EITC receipt (or the receipt of other anticipated income) varies by family structure, which would provide a more complete picture of how families smooth their consumption.
